Al Jazeera is a Qatar-based television network which began broadcasting in 1996. Al Jazeera grew in notoriety in the West for its highly critical coverage of the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan and, especially, Iraq. Connections with Islamists facilitated access to people that other networks didn’t have, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan. Not only was Al Jazeera the first global network on the ground in Afghanistan, it could offer interviews with Taliban leaders. It was also the first network during the war that could bypass Pentagon restrictions on images of violence, which are normally controlled in western media. Thus, Al Jazeera was unique in its ability to show images not otherwise visible to the American public. To counter Al Jazeera’s perceived anti-American effects in the region, the U.S. government launched Radio Sawa and television stations Al-Hurra and Al-Iraqiya, which had relatively little following among Arab viewers.

The United States has had a complicated relationship with Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera’s coverage of the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq was decidedly negative and the United States government publicly condemned the station for its bias, which included broadcasting videos of Osama Bin Laden’s speeches. The US Central Intelligence Agency alleged that Al Jazeera’s broadcasts contained secret messages for al-Qaeda operatives and accused the network of sending hidden messages to Islamist radicals. Such allegations remain speculative. Negative coverage of American foreign policy has been immensely politically useful for Qatar, serving as the most important counterbalance in the country’s close political and military relationship with America.

A wider range of voices has criticized the network for its support of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In the wake of the 2013 popular military coup that deposed former president Muhammad Morsi, the government under Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has cracked down on Al Jazeera journalists and stations working and broadcasting in Egypt.

Sources:

Leslie Evans, “Al Jazeera, Radio Sawa Founders Report on Media in the Middle East,” UCLA International Institute, November 4, 2003, accessed November 26, 2013.

Naomi Sakr. "Seen and Starting To Be Heard: Women and the Arab Media in a Decade of Change." Social Research: An International Quarterly 69 (2002): 821-850.

Tal Samuel-Azran, Al-Jazeera and US War Coverage (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, 2010), p. 1.

The al-Thani family, a member of the Tamimi tribe, is the ruling family of Qatar. Unlike other Arab rulers, the family is neither a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad nor of long-standing tenure in their kingdom; rather, their rise to power was the result of British and Ottoman imperial politics. As their rise parallels the creation of an independent Qatar, the two entities are inextricably linked. 

The British designation of the al-Thanis as monarchs of Qatar was by no means assured as there were other families with greater connections, power, and/or longevity in the region. Muhammad bin Thani was able to politically maneuver himself in relation to the British in order to achieve a position as a first among equals, a position which his descendants continuously asserted.

Today, members of the al-Thani family dominate key government ministries and receive a significant share of state revenue. Both appointment and distribution are a key means of preventing internal factionalism and strife as the family, which at times has numbered almost half the citizenry, is the primary source of political opposition to any ruling emir. More importantly, the former emir Sheikh Hamad amended the constitution in 1996 to allow a sitting emir to name his successor. This legal change limits one important source of family leverage.

The family became Wahhabi in the early 20^th century as a diplomatic courtesy in Shaikh Jassim bin Muhammad Al-Thani’s courtship of Saudi friendship and protection. However, the family’s political authority has remained independent of their religious identity.

Sources:

Allen Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012).

Mehran Kamrava. "Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar." The Middle East Journal 63(2009): 401-420.

Rosemarie Said Zahlan.  The Making of the Modern Gulf States:  Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.  Revised edition.  Reading:  Ithaca Press, 1998.

Roughly 9.6% of Qatar’s population is Christian, the overwhelming majority of which are Filipino, Indian, and Lebanese noncitizen workers though may include some Qatari converts from Islam. Foreign missionary groups are not permitted to work in the country. Prior to the ongoing construction of Churches, Christians met in private homes and community centers for worship. Both the government and Christian leaders promote a need for discretion and friendly communication, and Christian symbols are not permitted on the exterior of church buildings.

Most Christians are Roman Catholic, followed by Protestants, Anglicans, and unaffiliated Christians. Six churches are recognized by the Qatari government: Roman Catholic, Anglican, Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic, and Indian Christian. Smaller unrecognized denominations, largely Protestant, are expected to hold services under the aegis of one of the six recognized groups.

Several churches have been built and a number of others have been approved for future construction. A Catholic church opened in March 2008, the land for which was donated directly the Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa. An Anglican Church was consecrated in September 2013 with a 15,000 seat capacity and is overseen by the Anglican Diocese of Cyprus and the Gulf. A number of other churches are planned for the same complex, known as the Mesaymir Religious Complex or “Church City,” a move seen as consistent with Qatari efforts to modernize and appeal to expatriate workers. Catholic mass is offered throughout the day in the various languages of its congregants, including Arabic, English, French, Italian, Konkani, Sinhala, Tagalog, Tamil, and Urdu, while the Anglican Church is home to sixty other Evangelical, Protestant, and Pentecostal congregations.

Sources:

Matthew Davies, “Christians in Qatar celebrate formal opening of Anglican center,” Evangelical News Service, October 2, 2013, accessed November 21, 2013.

Caryle Murphy, “For the first time, Christians in Qatar worship in church,” Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 2009.

Image Credits:

"Catholic Church in Doha," Ian Quinn (2009), from Flickr Creative Commons.

Education City is a 2,500-acre “multiversity” campus on the western edge of Doha. The campus includes eight universities offering a variety of degree programs, a science and technology park, teaching hospital, medical research center, the Qatar Convention Center, and the Al Jazeera Children’s Channel. The development is part of Qatar National Vision 2030, the country’s plan to transition from a hydrocarbon-based to a knowledge-based economy. The government earmarks 2.8 per cent of gross domestic product towards research and development activities carried out there.

The project’s goals include the production of a local pool of well-trained graduates and to establish Qatar as a regional research hub. Prior to its creation most male Qataris pursued post-secondary education in American universities; many did not return and those who returned could not always find appropriate employment. Due to cultural restrictions on travel, education for most women ceased after high school. All classes on Education City campuses are co-educational. This has sparked some controversy among Qataris, though these families may also choose to send their children to the gender-segregated Qatar University, the national university unaffiliated with Education City.

Education City is the brainchild of the former emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, and the al-Thani family plays a significant role in the project’s implementation. The Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development oversees project development. Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al-Missned, the former emir’s consort and the mother of the current emir, serves as the foundation’s chair. 

At the heart of Education City are the satellite campuses of two European and six American universities, including Virginia Commonwealth University, Weill Cornell Medical College, Texas A&M University, Carnegie Mellon University, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Northwestern University, University College London, and Ecole des hautes études commerciales de Paris. Additionally, in 2007 Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi presided over the establishment of the College of Islamic Studies, which houses the Al-Qaradawi Center for Research in Moderate Thought, as well as centers on Islamic finance and Islam and public policy. Universities and specific fields of study were selected by the Qatari government according to Qatar’s strategic development goals. The foundation pays for all buildings, overheads, and staff salaries; the universities receive the student fees.  

The first school opened in 1997. Over a decade later, construction on the campus continues unabated. While many celebrate Education City and its efforts, the project is not without critics. Some wonder whether it is merely a state-funded effort to improve Qatar’s international image, particularly in light of the country’s censorship laws as contrary to Western standards of free scholarship, and its criminalization of homosexuality as incompatible with the schools’ anti-discrimination policies. While acknowledging that free expressions ends outside the campus walls, defenders point out that the contracts with the university prohibit government interference in hiring, tenure, curriculum, and admissions decisions.

Sources:

Delinda C. Hanley.  “Qatar's Education City Is Building Bridges to a Better Future.” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 26 (August, 2007): 30-1.

Simeon Kerr. "Doha Learning Zone is a Boost for Locals."  Financial Times, Oct 21, 2013. 

Ursula Lindsey. “Qatar Welcomes American Universities on its Own Terms.”  The Chronicle of Higher Education, November 18, 2013, accessed June 3, 2014.

Mari Luomi, John T. Crist, Bushra Alam, and Muhammad Bilal Shakir. “Environmental Sustainability in Qatar's Education City: Strategies, Initiatives and Education.” QScience Connect 2013:41.

Katherine Zoepf. “In Qatar's 'Education City,’ U.S. Colleges Build Atop a Gusher.”  The Chronicle of Higher Education, April 22, 2005, accessed May 25, 2014.

Judaism is an officially recognized religion by the state of Qatar, though no data is available on the size of Qatar’s Jewish non-citizen population. While the government officially protects the three Abrahamic faiths, for example, by issuing fines for derogatory speech, it has yet to punish newspapers and other publications in Qatar that run offensive images referring to Jews or to Israel. No reports of religious discrimination, either from the government or Qatari populace, were recorded in 2011 and 2012.

In 2005, Jewish leaders attended the Third Annual Interfaith Forum for the first time, hosted by the Doha International Center for Interfaith Dialogue (DICID). In response, several Muslim leaders refused to attend, including Yusuf al-Qaradawi and former Egyptian Grand Mufti Sheikh Muhammad Tantawi, citing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Jewish representatives have participated in all DICID conferences since 2005.

Sources:

Asharq al-Awsat, “Muslim and Jewish religious figures boycott the third Interfaith Forum in Doha,” Asharq al-Awsat, June 30, 2005, accessed November 21, 2013.

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “International Religious Freedom Report for 2012: Qatar,” U.S. Department of State (2012), accessed November 21, 2013.

Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani (b. 1952) reigned as Emir of Qatar from 1995 to 2013, when he stepped down in favor of Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, a son by his second wife, Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al-Misnad. Frustrated with the innate conservatism of his own father’s government, especially the slow speed of economic growth and development, Sheikh Hamad took power in a successful coup. Upon assuming power, Sheikh Hamad promised extensive economic and political reform.  While some of the promised political liberalization occurred, including the enfranchisement of women and the periodic holding of elections for various entities, change slowed as the sheikh consolidated his power with respect to other members of his family. 

Economic and social changes are far more significant. Unlike his father, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad, who retained tight control over state oil revenues, Sheikh Hamad expanded the base of recipients, ensuring that all native Qataris, especially his extended family, shared in the material benefits derived from exploitation of the country’s resources. The visibility Sheikh Hamad granted to his second wife, Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al-Misnad, and daughters as officials in various high-profile Qatari institutions affirms the possibility of greater opportunities for women than found in some other Arab states.  Similarly, the invitation to Western, mostly American, universities to set up satellite campuses suggests a certain openness to scholarly debate.  The decision to include a Jesuit school, Washington, DC’s Georgetown University, amongst those institutions provides a symbol of increased religious freedom.  Similarly, the emir has allowed the construction of churches for Christian expatriates and the existence of a parallel family law legal system for Shi’a Muslims.

Sources:   

James M. Dorsey.  “Wahhabism v. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia.”  RSIS Working Paper Series No. 262, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 2013. Accessed June 24, 2014.

Allen Fromherz. Qatar: A Modern History (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012).

Mehran Kamrava. "Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar." The Middle East Journal 63 (2009): 401-420.

<p>
    Sheikha Mayassa Bint Hamad al-Thani<strong> </strong>(b. 1983) is a member of the Qatari ruling family and a prominent art collector. She is the sister of Qatari Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, and the daughter of former Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani and Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al-Missned. Sheikha Mayassa’s accomplishments in the Qatari and Gulf arts world are many, including chairing Qatar Museums since 2006—an aggregate of various contemporary and historical art and culture museums—chairing the Doha Tribeca Film Festival, and she is also the founder of the philanthropic organization Reach Out to Asia.
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<p>
    She is a notable and powerful collector of modern art, having spent more on acquisitions in 2013 than the Tate (London) and Museum of Modern Art (New York) combined. These efforts are part of a wider plan to establish Qatar as a regional arts hub that will shine in the Middle East, if not rival major art centers elsewhere in the world. Many of these pieces are on public display in Doha, including sometimes controversial works by Damien Hirst, Takashi Murakami, and Shirin Neshat.
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    <em>Sources:</em>
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<p>
    <a data-url="http://artreview.com/power_100/sheikha_al-mayassa_bint_hamad_bin_khalifa..." href="http://artreview.com/power_100/sheikha_al-mayassa_bint_hamad_bin_khalifa...">“Sheikha Al-Mayassa bint Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani,”</a>&nbsp;<em>ArtReview</em>, 2015, accessed January 7, 2015.
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<p>
    Robin Pogrebin,&nbsp;<a data-url="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/arts/design/qatar-uses-its-riches-to-b..." href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/arts/design/qatar-uses-its-riches-to-b...">“Qatari Riches Are Buying Art World Influence,”</a> <em>The New York Times</em>, July 22, 2013, accessed January 7, 2015.
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Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al-Misnad (b. 1959) is the mother of the current emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, and the second wife and consort of the former emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani. A decidedly visible presence during her husband’s reign, she served in various high profile positions both domestically and abroad.

Sheikha Mozah is the daughter of Nasser bin Abdullah al-Misnad. Al-Misnad was critical of the former monarch, and made public appeals for a more equitable distribution of wealth amongst the Qatari citizenry, leading to his arrest and imprisonment. Many of her family members fled to Kuwait. Sheikha Mozah met her husband while studying at Qatar University; they married in 1977 in what appears to have been a love match.

The Sheikha’s many roles include chair of the Qatar Foundation (since 1996), chair of the Arab Democracy Foundation, chair of the Sidra Medical and Research Center, president of the Supreme Council for Family Affairs, member of the Weill Cornell Medical College Board of Overseers, and UNESCO Special Envoy for Basic and Higher Education. Named one of Forbes’ 100 Most Powerful Women, she is credited as the driving force behind Education City and the Al Jazeera Children’s Channel. She is also credited with spearheading a comprehensive reform of Qatar’s education system; opening the region’s first battered women’s shelter; creating a culture of public debate through Doha Debates, a monthly, public town-hall meeting modeled after England's Oxford Union broadcast over the BBC; facilitating the construction and opening of Qatar’s first Catholic church to serve the country’s many foreign workers; and launching the Qatar Business Women Awards.

Sheikha Mozah serves as a symbol of Qatar’s efforts to overcome stereotypes of the role of women in a Muslim society, which are not without controversy. Supporters of an attempted coup in 2011 specifically condemned the Sheikha’s public appearances in the media, which they considered shocking and contrary to Qatari tradition. In interviews and public appearances Sheikha Mozah is quick to disclaim any attempt to westernize women’s roles. In a keynote address at the 2006 Carnegie-Mellon University graduation exercises, she clarified the harmony between Islamic principles and women’s rights. Using examples of important women in Arab and Islamic history, she concluded:

“Islam has always guaranteed the full rights of women and women have always occupied a central role in Islamic civilizations. … It is important to remember that these women were consulted in forming legislative order in Islamic societies and they heavily influenced policies that were to govern social, political, economic and military issues. These same policies are the matrix of our life today.” (Dye, 2006: 747).

Sources:

Dye, Michael B. “Qatar: The Pearl of the Middle East and Its Role in the Advancement of Women's Rights.” U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 84 (2006).

ENP Newswire. “Commercialbank Supports Empowerment of Women at the Qatar Business Women Awards 2010/2011.” December 22, 2011. Accessed May 27, 2014.

Felder, Dell, and Mirka Vuollo. “Qatari Women in the Workforce.” RAND-Qatar Policy Institute Working Paper Series WR-612-QATAR, August 2008.

Harman, Danna.  “Backstory:  Qatar Reformed by a Modern Marriage.” The Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 2007. Accessed May 29, 2014.

Sakr, Naomi. "Seen and Starting To Be Heard: Women and the Arab Media in a Decade of Change." Social Research: An International Quarterly 69 (2002): 821-850.

Qatar is remarkable in the region for its well-integrated Shi’a Muslim community, which makes up roughly 5-20% of the population and which represents some of the nation’s most prominent merchant families. Most of the Shi’a immigrated from Iran during the waning days of the Qajar period in the late nineteenth century, or during the 1960s and 1970s. Though Shi’a Muslims participate in various institutions across society, the government regards them warily, particularly following anti-government protests in neighboring Bahrain led by the nation’s large and disempowered Shi’a community during the Arab Spring.

Sources:

Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), p. 73.

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “International Religious Freedom Report for 2012: Qatar,” HumanRights.gov (2012), accessed November 26, 2013.

Qatar is home to a number of tribal families in addition to the ruling al-Thani family. These include the al-Khalifa, the al-Sudan, the al-Saud, the Utubi, the Bani Khalid, the Qawasim, the al-Musallam, the al-Ainain, the al-Attiyah, and the al-Kuwari. Several of these families, such as the al-Sudan and the al-Musallam, predate the al-Thani family’s arrival in Qatar. The al-Khalifa and the al-Saud are kin to the rulers of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, respectively, while the al-Sudan and the Bani Khalid are among Doha’s oldest residents. The latter received exceptional rights and privileges, including exemption from the pearl taxation.  Thus, without the intervention of the British in 1868, either Bahrain or Saudi Arabia might have subsumed the Qatar peninsula under the al-Khalifa or al-Saud family or an old, established family might have emerged organically as the kingdom’s ruler.

Doha neighborhoods are effectively tribal neighborhoods and the family council, or majlis, makes decisions about both personal and community matters. Tribal allegiance carries over into the structure and processes of Qatar’s political system. Where electoral systems exist, most citizens vote according to their tribe; this divides representative institutions along tribal lines, helping to diffuse dissent.  

The al-Khalifa, a branch of the Utubi Arabs from Central Arabia, migrated to Kuwait and from there expanded their trading, fishing, and piracy activities into Bahrain and northern Qatar. By the 19^th century, they were the dominant family in the Northern Gulf region. Under the al-Khalifa, the northwestern city of Zubarah served as the economic center of Qatar. The rise of the Doha-based al-Thani family and its successful efforts to separate Qatar from the al-Khalifa-led Bahrain shifted the balance of power and the center of trade to the south.  This centuries-old tribal rivalry continues, embodied by the dispute between Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar Islands. However, there is an extensive web of intermarriage between the two families and today, the al-Khalifa are considered the second most powerful tribe in Qatar.

The al-Attiyah are another historically important family that have also strategically married into the al-Thani family. The mother of former Sheikh Hamad was a member of the al-Attiyah family. These marriages have resulted in prominent state appointments, including Qatar’s first chief of police and, more recently, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Energy, and chief of staff of Qatar’s armed forces. The family is historically associated with the army.  

The al-Sudan tribe accompanied the al-Khalifa on their migration from Arabia, settling in in northern Qatar where they undertook both agricultural and fishing activities. They are among the oldest of the tribes, as evidenced by their domestic presence in a central Doha neighborhood. 

The Bani Khalid were a powerful Arab tribe that asserted their independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 19^th century.  In Qatar they established fishing villages and ruled much of al-Hasa and Qatar before the rise of the al-Sauds.  They are among the oldest of the tribes but have lost almost all of their influence. The al-Ainain family was the tribe’s most prominent clan, controlling Doha until its exile in the 1820s to Wakra in the southernmost part of Qatar.

The Al-Musallam have the longest recorded history in Qatar. An Ottoman source from the 16^th century designates a member of the family as the Sheikh of Qatar. They dominated the northern Qatar settlements of al-Huwaila and Zubara until the arrival of the Utubi al-Khalifa. However, by the 1820s, they were outnumbered by the al-Thanis and other allied tribes. 

The al-Kuwari family shares a common ancestor with the al-Thanis and cooperates closely with the ruling family. This makes them highly influential and results in appointment to important government posts. Originally based in Doha, in 1878 they moved to Fuwayrat on Qatar’s northeast shore in protest of Jassim bin Muhammad bin Thani’s alliance with the Ottoman Empire.

Sources:

Christopher M. Blanchard. Qatar: Background and US Relations.  Washington, DC:  Congressional Research Service, 2010. 

Allen Fromherz. Qatar: A Modern History (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012).

Mehran Kamrava. "Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar." The Middle East Journal 63(2009): 401-420.

Rosemarie Said Zahlan.  The Making of the Modern Gulf States:  Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998).

Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926) is a Sunni Muslim theologian and one of the most highly respected scholars in the Arabic-speaking world and the wider Muslim world. He is considered by his followers as a moderate thinker and part of the Muslim reformist tradition, continuing the work of early reformists such as Muhammad ‘Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, though unlike them, he does not argue that Islam must update itself to meet modern needs. Rather, he argues that Islam already provides genuine answers to modern questions. His position is consistent with the wave of revivalism triggered by the perceived failure of secular nationalism following the 1967 Egyptian loss to Israel and spread throughout the Muslim world. He informally serves as the main ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, for which he is controversial, especially in Egypt, his country of birth. And, though Muslim Salafis and members of the Brotherhood are frequently at odds, al-Qaradawi has been embraced by some Salafis, thus crossing multiple boundaries in Islamic thought.

His main topics of interest include the role of women in Islam, education, Islamic finance, Islamic minority rights, the family, arts and entertainment, Islamic law, and the Palestinian cause, though he is best known in the western press for his controversial positions on various highly politicized topics, including religious violence, homosexuality, and Israel. As such, he has been barred from traveling on numerous instances to European countries and to the United States.

Qaradawi studied in the Faculty of Theology at Cairo’s al-Azhar University, where he organized an Azhari group of Muslim Brotherhood members and preached on behalf of the Brotherhood. Qaradawi received a doctorate from al-Azhar in 1973, having written a dissertation on obligatory charity (zakat) in Islam. Despite his academic connections to al-Azhar, he is perceived as an independent scholar and an Islamic authority without ties to religious institutions and has been critical of al-Azhar’s ties to the Egyptian government as well as a major proponent of Azhari reform.

Al-Qaradawi’s ideas are widely disseminated throughout the Arabic-speaking world and through translations of his major works. His most prominent impact is through the weekly program “Shari’a and Life” (shari’a w’al-hayat) on Al Jazeera, which has aired regularly since the network’s founding in 1996. The program is a platform allowing him to discuss various topics, and is followed by millions of viewers. He also has a weekly program on Qatar Television where he answers viewer questions; the same station broadcasts his weekly Friday sermon. He was also the main scholar behind Islam Online, a popular, Cairo-based Islamic website featuring resources and fatwas, and he was one of the first scholars to develop a personal website. These media platforms have amplified his message, making him perhaps the foremost legal scholar in the Arabic-speaking world.

Yusuf al-Qaradawi has had a major impact on the growth and direction of religious institutions in Qatar. He moved to Qatar in 1961 to lead an institute of religious studies and quickly established himself as a popular preacher. He became a personal guide to Sheikh Khalifa al-Thani, who granted him a Qatari passport after Egyptian authorities refused to extend his stay in Qatar. This allowed him to travel and lecture widely. He served as the principle of the Religious Institute (ma’had dini) beginning in 1961 and founded Qatar University’s Faculty of Shari’a, which began accepting students in 1977. In 1973 he became the director of the Islamic Studies Department at Qatar University’s College of Education, and in 1980 founded the Centre for Sunna and Sira Studies, also at Qatar University. In 2008, the Emir’s wife, Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser opened the al-Qaradawi Research Center for Islamic Moderation and Renewal at the Qatar Foundation’s Faculty of Islamic Studies. He is also affiliated with a wide variety of Islamic institutions outside of the Arab world, including prominent organizations in Europe.

The Muslim Brotherhood

Yusuf al-Qaradawi has been affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood since the age of fourteen, having joined after listening to a speech by Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna. He was arrested in 1954 along with other Brotherhood members on suspicion organizing a failed assassination attempt against Egyptian President Gamel ‘Abdel Nasser, and released two years later, though was barred from preaching. Throughout his college years he was mentored by the Azhari scholar Muhammad al-Ghazali (d. 1996), also a member of the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has twice requested that he serve as their supreme leader (al-murshid al-‘amm). Although he turned them down, he continues to serve as a primary inspiration for the Brotherhood.

Like Qaradawi, other Muslim Brotherhood members have been drawn to Qatar as a friendly space where they can meet and disseminate ideas without risk, compared to the hostile political climate in Egypt. Qaradawi has often played a role in organizing Brotherhood meetings in Doha.

The Arab Spring

In February 2011, Qaradawi traveled to Cairo to lead prayers in Tahrir Square a week after longtime Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was removed from office. Qaradawi has been outspoken in his condemnation of the popular military coup that unseated President Muhammad Morsi and has issued fatwas supporting protests against the military government. For this, he was roundly criticized by the Egyptian government and by Egyptian religious scholars in support of coup.

Sources

• “Al-Qaradawi Center for Islamic Moderation and Renewal,” Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies (2013), accessed November 25, 2013.
• Juan Cole, “Egyptian Backlash against Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi’s Call for foreign Intervention in Egypt,” Informed Comment, July 29, 2013, accessed November 25, 2013.
• Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, “Introduction,” Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, eds. Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 1-15.
• Bettina Gräf, “Yusuf al-Qaradawi,” The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, John L. Esposito and Emad el-Din Shahin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 222-236.
• Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, “Yusuf al-Qaradawi and al-Azhar,” Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, eds. Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 27-53.
• Husam Tammam, “Yusuf Qaradawi and the Muslim Brothers: The Nature of a Special Relationship,” Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, eds. Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 55-83.